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Encounters with new people result in the extraction and storage in memory of both their
external features, allowing us to recognize them later, and their internal traits, allowing
us to better control our current interactions with them and anticipate our future ones.
Just as we extract, encode, store, retrieve and update the representations of others
so, too, do we process representations of ourselves. These representations, which
rely on declarative memory, may be altered or cease to be accessible in amnesia.
Nonetheless, studies of amnesic patients have yielded the surprising observation that
memory impairments alone do not prevent patients from making accurate trait self-
judgments. In this review article, we discuss prevailing explanations for preserved
self-evaluation in amnesia and propose an alternative one, based on the concept of
introspective computation. We also consider molecular and anatomical aspects of brain
functioning that potentially support introspective computation.
Keywords: amnesia, episodic memory, trait self-knowledge, self-evaluation, self-representations, identity
In this review article, we discuss the literature on the representations people have of themselves,
focusing on representations of self-personality traits. The latter are usually assessed using self-
evaluation tasks, where participants are provided with a list of traits and asked to rate their
self-descriptiveness. Self-evaluation on a set of traits involves retrieving personal information from
semantic as well as episodic memory. Surprisingly, studies have shown that patients with semantic
and/or episodic memory impairments are still able to provide accurate trait self-judgments. In this
article, we review these clinical cases, as well as possible explanations for preserved self-evaluation
in amnesia provided in the literature. In a different section, we describe an alternative cognitive
operation that we called introspective computation that may be used to judge the self-descriptiveness
of personality traits. This mental operation, which does not rely on personal information stored in
long-term memory, may allow patients to provide accurate judgments of their personality traits
despite their amnesia. We also discuss cognitive operations, including introspective computation,
used in self-evaluation tasks, and their possible impairments in patients unaware of their
personality changes.
TRAIT INFERENCE
To identify particular human beings, we have to rely on information regarding their external
and/or internal attributes that we have already memorized. Contrary to the external attributes
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that are directly perceived through our senses, internal ones have
to be inferred from observed behavior. Our ability to achieve this,
known as theory of mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978), allows
us to appreciate people’s current moods or goals, thereby helping
us adjust our present interactions with them. It also allows us
to estimate their internal traits, which shed light on the causes
of their current actions and their general behavioral tendencies,
thereby helping us anticipate our future interactions with them
(McCarthy and Skowronski, 2011).
Empirical evidence suggests that while trait inference
can be consciously initiated by individuals, it nevertheless
meets the criteria for an automatic process (McCarthy and
Skowronski, 2011), as it usually takes place without any
explicit intention, awareness or control (Winter et al., 1985).
It occurs during the initial stages of behavioral observation
(Winter and Uleman, 1984; Uleman et al., 1996) and may
result in the inference of multiple and sometimes even
competing traits (Ham and Vonk, 2011). Different social
situations linking us to the individuals we observe may influence
our tendency to infer traits. For example, in line with our
general propensity to represent distant objects on an abstract
level (Trope and Liberman, 2010), our tendency to infer
traits increases with the psychological distance we perceive
between ourselves and others, whether they are distant in
space or time (Rim et al., 2009). This raises the question of
whether we construct representations of our own traits, and
if so, why.
POSITIVE SELF-PERCEPTION
Just as we form and update representations of other people, so
we form and update ones of ourselves, to help us regulate our
interactions with others and take decisions about our personal
lives. We construct self-representations via interactions with
our environment (mostly other people), which communicates
attributes to us through both direct (Bollich et al., 2011)
and indirect feedback (Harris and Rosenthal, 1985). During
the creation and updating of our self-representations, we can
engage in self-assessment to increase the accuracy of our self-
perceptions, and self-verification to confirm them. However,
these motivations seem to be weaker than the motivation to
possess a positive self-view, as people choose to process—and
tend to remember and acknowledge—the positive information
about themselves rather than the negative information, even
when it is important for the self (for a review see Sedikides,
2007). A positive self-view can be achieved either by maintaining
and elevating our positive features or by protecting them against
threatening information.
If we are mentally healthy, we tend to see ourselves in
a more positive light than we see others on a wide variety
of desirable attributes. Needless to say, our belief of being
above average (Williams and Gilovich, 2008), termed the better-
than-average effect (Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986), is not shared
by others, who usually perceive us in a less positive light.
Despite not being objective, our overly positive self-view has
several advantages, the most important of which seem to be
the attainment of relevant goals, and both psychological and
physical wellbeing (for a review see Sedikides and Alicke,
2012).
ASSESSMENT OF
SELF-REPRESENTATIONS
Studies designed to assess people’s explicit self-representations
essentially use two kinds of tasks, involving either self-
description or self-evaluation. In self-description tasks,
individuals freely describe themselves, whereas in self-
evaluation tasks, they are asked to assess themselves on a
series of statements. The best-known self-description task is
the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954), in
which individuals give 20 different answers to the open-ended
question ‘‘Who am I?’’ The precise content of these responses
can vary considerably across individuals, but participants usually
start by providing the social categories to which they belong,
subsequently reporting what characterizes them as individuals,
which for the most part includes their physical attributes,
internal traits, and preferences. Analysis and interpretation
of these open answers is, however, complex, for in addition
to a high level of inconsistency across the scoring methods
proposed in the literature, we still do not know how these
self-descriptions are selected by individuals and which cognitive
operations are at work. While there is some evidence to suggest
that self-descriptions are essentially driven by a semantic
type of self-knowledge (Grilli and Verfaellie, 2015), neither
their importance (Trafimow and Finlay, 2001) nor their
descriptiveness (Carpenter and Meade-Pruitt, 2008) can entirely
account for their generation. Other hypotheses, such as chronic
accessibility or contextual salience, still need to be tested.
The second type of task used to assess participants’ self-
representations involves self-evaluation on a list of traits. In this
type of task, participants are asked to rate each of the traits
for self-descriptiveness on a Likert-type scale. The ratings are
usually processed in such a way as to indicate the positivity
of the self-judgments. Two functionally independent declarative
memory systems can be separately or jointly activated during
self-evaluation. Episodic memory is used to recall instances of
specific behaviors exemplifying particular traits, while semantic
memory provides direct access to traits represented in the
form of general knowledge. The results of experimental studies
using a task facilitation paradigm to infer the type of cognitive
operation involved, on the basis of participants’ reaction times,
suggest that in situations requiring self-evaluation on traits
(e.g., autonomous), individuals initially access trait-consistent
information, in the form of semantic self-knowledge (e.g.,
‘‘I am an autonomous person’’), as this allows for speedy
decision making. If they do not possess trait-consistent semantic
information, access to trait-inconsistent semantic information
(e.g., ‘‘I am a dependent person’’) may be sufficient to conclude
that the trait under consideration does not apply to them (Klein
et al., 1992). However, when information from a self-knowledge
database is retrieved (e.g., ‘‘I am an autonomous person’’), it
usually triggers the retrieval of contrasting episodic memories
(e.g., ‘‘When I bought my first video camera, I asked a friend
to show me how to use it’’), thus helping to limit its scope. It
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is worth noting that episodic memories matching the accessed
trait self-knowledge are not retrieved (e.g., ‘‘The last time I
encountered a problem with my video camera, I resolved it by
myself ’’), probably to avoid information redundancy (Klein et al.,
2001).
SELF-EVALUATION IN AMNESIC
SYNDROMES
When it comes to understanding the mental strategies that allow
for accurate self-judgment, cases of patients with episodic or
semantic memory impairments or with personality changes are
particularly informative. Most of the studies examining these
cases have used self-evaluation tasks, as these allow for greater
standardization, and the cognitive mechanisms behind them are
understood better than those behind self-description tasks. In the
next section, we review studies reporting surprising observations
of accurate self-judgment in patients with severe declarative
memory impairments. We discuss the conclusions drawn by
the authors of these studies and, where appropriate, suggest
alternative interpretations.
Investigators of self-evaluation in the field of
neuropsychology have primarily focused their attention on issues
related to episodic memory. Several studies examining patients
with episodic memory impairments have come to the surprising
conclusion that the latter have no real impact on patients’ self-
evaluation. One such patient, WJ, rendered temporarily amnesic
by a head injury, was asked on two occasions to complete a
self-evaluation task (Klein et al., 1996). She underwent her first
testing session 5 days after the injury, at which point she was
unable to recall episodic memories from the previous 6 months,
corresponding to her first semester at university, although some
memories that were older than 12 months could be recalled.
WJ’s personal semantic knowledge, including that which she
had acquired during her previous 6 months at university, was
intact. The second testing session took place 3 weeks later, after
she had recovered from her episodic memory impairments. Her
performance on self-evaluation tasks while amnesic (first testing
session) showed only a weak correlation between the university
and high-school periods, indicating that her self-judgment in
the present was not based on memories of her past. Moreover,
her self-evaluation for the university period, performed while
amnesic (first testing session), was significantly correlated with
the one she performed after recovering from amnesia (second
testing session), indicating that despite the loss of episodic
memories, WJ was able to describe what she was like.
Even more convincing evidence of accurate self-judgment
despite an inability to access episodic memories was obtained
from Patient KC, who became permanently amnesic after a
motorcycle accident (Tulving, 1993). In addition to a total
loss of episodic memory, covering his entire lifespan, KC’s
accident caused a profound change in his personality. More
than 10 years after his head injury, he was asked to rate
himself on a list of trait-adjectives. KC’s self-evaluation ratings
were comparable to his mother’s ratings of his present—but
not his past—personality, suggesting that KC’s self-judgment
matched his current personality, and was not based on his
previous knowledge about himself. As KC was incapable of
recollecting any events that had been personally experienced
since the accident, his ability to accurately report his own
traits could not be supported by his episodic memory. Tulving
therefore concluded that KC’s accurate self-evaluation was based
on his updated ‘‘self-knowledge, belonging to the same category
as all his other knowledge about the world’’ (Tulving, 1993,
p. 155).
Following this reasoning, impairment in semantic memory
(i.e., general knowledge about the world and the self)
should compromise accurate self-evaluation. However, a study
conducted among patients with semantic dementia nonetheless
showed that these patients were able to complete the self-
evaluation task, and their self-ratings were comparable to those
of the control group (Duval et al., 2012). However, as the patients’
traits had not been rated by their relatives, the authors could
not definitely conclude that patients with semantic dementia can
accurately judge themselves.
This issue was investigated by Klein et al. (2002), who
examined Patient DB, rendered permanently amnesic by anoxia
following cardiac arrest. DB’s severe retrograde and anterograde
amnesia affected his episodic memory, manifesting itself in his
inability to recall a single specific event he had experienced
either before or after the cardiac arrest. Moreover, while
DB’s general level of intelligence seemed to be preserved,
his knowledge of public as well as personal facts and events
was somewhat impaired, albeit less severely than his episodic
memory. Surprisingly, DB’s self-evaluation was accurate, as his
self-ratings correlated significantly with his daughter’s ratings
of him. By contrast, DB’s knowledge about his daughter’s
traits seemed to have been affected by his illness, as the
correlation between his ratings of his daughter and her self-
ratings was nonsignificant. Taken together, it seems that while
DB’s episodic and semantic memory impairments affected his
knowledge of personal facts and other people’s traits, they
nonetheless spared his ability to accurately rate himself. Klein
et al. (2002) interpreted DB’s accurate self-evaluation despite
episodic and semantic memory impairments as evidencing a
dissociation between general semantic knowledge and semantic
knowledge of one’s own traits. The latter, unlike knowledge about
other people’s traits, appears to be extremely resistant to brain
damage.
DB’s performance can be regarded in two ways, suggesting
the preservation of either a particular cognitive content (i.e., trait
self-knowledge) or a particular cognitive mechanism (i.e., a
cognitive operation, allowing him to reach conclusions about
his own traits despite the absence of trait self-knowledge). It
may even be that accurate self-judgment, episodic and semantic
memory impairments notwithstanding, recruits mechanisms
that do not depend on declarative memory. Such mechanisms
presumably only operate during self-evaluation, providing no
help during the evaluation of other people.
INTROSPECTIVE COMPUTATION
Data reported in the literature suggest that self-evaluation
essentially requires comparison of the rated trait with
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information retrieved from declarative memory. The latter
may either already exist in the abstracted form of a trait
(e.g., ‘‘I am an autonomous person’’) stored in semantic
memory, or else concern specific behavioral instances (e.g.,
‘‘Last time I encountered a problem with my video camera,
I resolved it myself ’’) stored in episodic memory that can
be used to compute a general conclusion about oneself—an
operation called inferential computation. However, on the
strength of observations in amnesic syndromes, we would
suggest that self-evaluation tasks requiring participants to
judge the traits they currently possess can also be performed
without retrieving personal information from declarative
memory, be it episodic or semantic. Impairment of both of
these memory systems is usually observed in patients with
dementia, which also experience difficulties in accurately
evaluating themselves. Although cases of patients producing
accurate self-judgments despite episodic and semantic memory
impairments are quite rare, they are not unheard of. We
suggest that in these cases, when asked to rate a trait (e.g.,
autonomous) for self-descriptiveness, patients compare the
trait to a mentally simulated content—an operation we call
introspective computation. In other words, they imagine a
situation that allows the trait to be verified (e.g., ‘‘How would I
act if I encountered a problem for which I had no solution?’’),
and then mentally simulate their behavioral tendency in
that situation. If this simulated tendency matches the trait
being rated (e.g., ‘‘If I encountered a problem, I would start
by trying to resolve it myself ’’), they conclude that they
possess it (e.g., ‘‘I am indeed an autonomous person’’). It is
important to stress here that, from our point of view, of all
the types of mental simulation the human brain is capable
of (for a review see Decety and Grèzes, 2006), the mental
simulation involved in introspective computation is quite
specific. Unlike the episodic mental simulation of future
scenarios conceptualized by Buckner and Carroll (2007) and
Schacter et al. (2008), introspective computation cannot be
described as episodic, as it essentially consists of a summary
simulation (sustained by working memory) of our own affective
reaction to particular circumstances. Instead of imagining a
precise spatiotemporal context and a detailed unfolding of
the situation, in this case we seek to capture our emotional
reaction or spontaneous inclination to act in one way or
another. In other words, we can use our current readiness
to behave in a certain manner as an indicator of our general
disposition to behave that way at all times, and thus conclude
that we either do or do not possess a particular trait (see
Figure 1).
Our mental simulation of how we would behave in an
imagined situation and our everyday behavior presumably share
the same foundation. We suggest that we possess an affective
mental content regarding our relation to the world that is not
necessarily conscious but, because it continuously governs our
daily behavior, it may potentially be inferred from our actions
and attitudes. This was conceptualized by Conway (2005) as the
working self, that is, an active self-goal hierarchy regulating our
affect, behavior and cognition, including the encoding, storage,
retrieval and updating of information in declarative memory.
This permanently active working self that strives to maintain our
coherent and efficient functioning may also be called upon to
guide our introspective computation, thereby allowing for the
simulation of our behavioral tendencies as they would occur in
real-life situations.
While introspective computation is one of the strategies
that may be used to rate oneself on a trait, there remains
the question of whether introspective computation alone can
account for normal performances on self-evaluation tasks. This
issue could be clarified if patients exhibiting a personality change
were assessed shortly after that change, before episodic and
semantic learning about their new personality had taken place.
Their ability to rate themselves would then have to rely on
introspective computation alone, as they would not have encoded
enough information about themselves in declarative memory.
To our knowledge, this kind of study has not so far been
conducted. For now, researchers seem to agree only on the
fact that episodic memories do not play a critical role in self-
evaluation. By contrast, it is hard to say whether a semantic
memory impairment spares accurate self-judgment because trait
self-knowledge does not depend on it or because introspective
computation allows for the mental simulation of one’s behavior
in the absence of self-representations retrieved from episodic and
semantic memory.
SELF-EVALUATION IN PATIENTS
UNAWARE OF THEIR PERSONALITY
CHANGES
Amnesic patients who are aware of their cognitive deficits
seem to accurately evaluate themselves, despite their episodic
and sometimes even semantic memory impairments. Things
become a lot more complicated when self-judgment is examined
in patients who are unaware of their personality changes,
as has been the case in several studies of patients with
Alzheimer’s disease. In addition to episodic and semantic
memory impairments, these patients exhibit a general cognitive
decline that is accompanied by behavioral and psychiatric
symptoms in the advanced stage, of which they seem to be
unaware. While patients in the moderate and even advanced
stages of Alzheimer’s disease are often able to complete
self-evaluation tasks, providing the latter are adjusted to
accommodate their cognitive deficits, they nonetheless do not
seem to take their symptoms into account.
For instance, when Patient KR (Klein et al., 2003), who
was unaware of her behavioral changes since being diagnosed
with Alzheimer’s disease, was asked to evaluate herself on a
list of traits, she provided a self-judgment that was inconsistent
with her current behavior, as judged by her daughter and
her caregiver at the assisted living facility, but consistent
with her previous behavior, according to her daughter and
son-in-law. Interestingly, KR seemed to possess preserved
knowledge of her daughter’s traits, but not her caregiver’s,
whom she had only known for the previous 2.5 years. These
observations were interpreted by the authors of the study as
reflecting a dysfunction of the patient’s semantic memory,
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FIGURE 1 | Different strategies that can be used during self-evaluation. When rating a given trait (e.g., autonomous), individuals can (1) directly compare it
with trait self-knowledge stored in semantic memory (e.g., “I am an autonomous person” or “I am a dependent person”); (2) retrieve a specific behavioral instance
linked to the rated trait from episodic memory (e.g., “The last time I encountered a problem with my video camera, I resolved it myself ” or “When I bought my first
video camera, I asked a friend to show me how to use it”) and use it to infer a general conclusion about themselves; or (3) mentally simulate their emotional
disposition to act in a specific situation (e.g., “If I encountered a problem, I would first try to resolve it myself ”), using it as an indicator of their general propensity to
act in this way at all times, and thus of the trait they may or may not possess. The latter operation, which does not rely on personal information stored in either
episodic or semantic declarative memory, is based on introspective computation.
namely her inability to encode the traits of recently met
people as well as to update her trait self-knowledge. They
suggested that this inability had not impacted the patient’s
judgment of her daughter, whose behavior had not changed,
but caused inaccurate self-evaluation, as the patient’s recent
behavioral changes were not taken into account (Klein et al.,
2003).
The hypothesis that inaccurate self-judgment in
neurodegenerative diseases is due to a failure to update
one’s personality traits was not, however, supported by recent
findings in a group of patients in the initial stage of Alzheimer’s
disease (Jedidi et al., 2014). In this study, the personality
changes over the previous 10 years reported by patients
were comparable to those reported by controls, indicating
that the patients with Alzheimer’s disease perceived their
long-term personality changes, without being aware of the
recent and more dramatic ones induced by the disease. As
the patients’ judgment of their current personality differed
significantly from their relatives’ judgments of both their
current personality and their past personality, they are
unlikely to have based their current personality judgment
on semantic knowledge about their previous personality
(Jedidi et al., 2014). Furthermore, these findings are in line
with data on amnesic syndromes, showing that episodic and
semantic memory impairments alone do not impact patients’
accurate self-judgment, possibly because the latter can still
rely on introspective computation. Why, therefore, was the
self-judgment of KR, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease,
not accurate?
We maintain that introspective computation is a very
resistant mechanism, remaining operational despite declarative
memory disorders. However, this cognitive operation only
allows for accurate self-evaluation if: (1) patients’ behavior
is stable, in which case their mentally simulated behavioral
tendency is indeed illustrative of their general behavior on a
daily basis; and (2) they can correctly judge their behavior,
which requires them to be aware of the overall consequences
of a given act and the way it would be judged by others.
We therefore suggest two possible explanations for KR’s
performance on the self-evaluation task, assuming that she
based it essentially on introspective computation, owing to
her memory impairments. First of all, it may be that her
working self was undergoing changes resulting from her
disease. Being unstable, it may have produced behavioral
symptoms quite randomly and inconsistently. A temporary
absence of the patient’s behavioral symptoms during the testing
session may have led her to mentally simulate a healthy
behavioral tendency, and thus to conclude that she did not
have any behavioral or psychiatric symptoms. We favor a
second explanation, however, whereby even if she was able to
mentally simulate her behavioral tendency (i.e., as it would
actually have occurred in a real-life situation), she may have
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had difficulty grasping its consequences, thus preventing her
from negatively judging it, and from considering herself as
possessing a negative trait in accordance with her negative
behavior.
If individuals have difficulty grasping the implications of
their deteriorating state or behavior, they will not see it
as problematic and will therefore not integrate this negative
connotation when judging themselves, even if their semantic
memory is fully functioning. We therefore suggest that it was not
KR’s memory difficulties per se, but her inability to accurately
judge her behavior, that can best explain why her self-judgment
continued to match her personality prior to the disease. This
interpretation is supported by the finding that patients diagnosed
with frontotemporal dementia, which does not involve anymajor
memory impairment in the early stage, are usually completely
unaware of their dramatic personality changes, whereas patients
in the initial stage of Alzheimer’s disease, despite being far more
affected by declarative memory decline, judge themselves far
more accurately in terms of their traits (Rankin et al., 2005;
Shany-Ur et al., 2014).
Data obtained in patients with cognitive and behavioral
impairments show that in order to alter their self-judgments,
which essentially means ending up with a more negative
one, patients need to be aware of their deficits. For instance,
one study showed that while patients in the early stage of
Alzheimer’s disease remain aware of their symptoms, their self-
evaluation on a list of traits tends to reveal a more negative
self-view than that of controls (Addis and Tippett, 2004). By
contrast, another group study showed that patients in the
moderate or advanced stages of Alzheimer’s disease have a
relatively positive perception of their traits and general behavior,
compared with healthy controls and even feel more satisfied
with themselves (Eustache et al., 2013). To sum up, the less
patients with degenerative disease are aware of their symptoms,
the less depressive they feel (for a review see Mograbi and
Morris, 2014) and the more positively they perceive themselves
(Naylor and Clare, 2008).
Nonetheless, episodic and semantic memory impairments do
seem to affect patients’ self-perception, although their impact
varies according to the task being used to assess it. Self-evaluation
tasks can be completed even by patients with neurodegenerative
diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease (Klein et al., 2003; Rankin
et al., 2005; Ruby et al., 2009; Eustache et al., 2013; Martinelli
et al., 2013; Jedidi et al., 2014; Shany-Ur et al., 2014), semantic
dementia (Duval et al., 2012), or frontotemporal dementia
(Rankin et al., 2005; Zamboni et al., 2010; Shany-Ur et al.,
2014; Sollberger et al., 2014), and most of the time indicate
that these patients possess a positive self-judgment comparable
to that of healthy participants. When asked to freely describe
themselves, however, patients with Alzheimer’s disease have
been shown to produce fewer self-descriptive statements (Addis
and Tippett, 2004; Eustache et al., 2013), which can partly be
explained by additional impairment of cognitive functions such
as self-initiated memory searching. However, these results may
also indicate deterioration of declarative self-conception, for in
the advanced stage of the disease, patients sometimes clearly
formulate the difficulty they have bringing to mind a conscious
and coherent representation of themselves, with some patients
producing statements such as ‘‘I don’t remember myself ’’.
On the basis of these observations, we suggest that, unlike
self-description tasks, self-evaluation tasks can be completed
using cognitive operations that are particularly resistant to
amnesia, because they are not based on self-representations
retrieved from declarative memory systems. While impaired
judgment abilities may result in overly positive self-evaluation
in patients with neurodegenerative diseases, the mechanism
involved in self-evaluation per se (i.e., introspective computation)
probably remains intact, explaining why patients can successfully
perform this task, despite considerable difficulty saying who
they are.
CEREBRAL UNDERPINNINGS
The nature of the self has been widely discussed by researchers
in different domains, and theoretical conceptions of the self
remain a matter of debate. In this context, our understanding
of the brain structures underlying the self is undermined by a
lack of comprehensive knowledge of the cognitive operations
the self involves. Nonetheless, new questions arising from the
use of neuroimaging techniques have helped to shift the focus
away from the self as content to the self as process (Northoff
et al., 2011). Most neuroimaging studies now tackle the self
by exploring two avenues: the neural operations mandatory
for the emergence of the sense of self; and brain regions that
are systematically associated with the processing of information
about the self (for example see Abraham, 2013; D’Argembeau,
2013).
More recently, several studies have been conducted to
measure brain activation patterns during self-evaluation tasks
and see how they vary according to cultural or genetic factors.
Data reported in the literature suggest that cultural differences
regarding self-perception may modulate the level of activation in
the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporoparietal junction,
anterior cingulate cortex, precuneus and hippocampus during
self-evaluation tasks (Zhu et al., 2007; Sul et al., 2012; Ma
et al., 2014). Nonetheless, genes coding for neurotransmitters
may influence these regions’ sensitivity to social factors. For
instance, some genes coding for serotonin neurotransmission
have been shown to prevent the modulation of neural
activity during self-evaluation tasks in those brain regions that
usually respond with different activation levels according to
participants’ culturally determined self-perceptions (Ma et al.,
2014). However, variations in brain activity according to
participants’ self-perceptions may merely reflect differences
in the cognitive operations used by participants during self-
evaluation, such as first- or third-person perspective taking
(Sul et al., 2012). These findings underline the need for a
better understanding of the role played by neurotransmission
systems and brain regions in different cognitive processes, as
well as the actual cognitive processes that are involved in self-
evaluation.
To our knowledge, introspective computation has never
been directly assessed in patients with amnesic syndromes.
However, functional imaging studies exploring self-evaluation
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in healthy volunteers could provide insights about the brain
regions that support it. While information retrieved from
declarative memory is used during other-evaluation as well as
self-evaluation tasks, introspective computation, by definition,
cannot apply to other people, and can only be used to evaluate
the self. Therefore, the neural underpinnings of introspective
computation could be captured by isolating brain activity
specifically associated with self-judgment and absent during
other-judgment on traits.
Several functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies have shown that self-evaluation tasks elicit greater activity
in the MPFC than other-evaluation tasks, whether the other
person is a famous public figure (Kelley et al., 2002; Zhu
et al., 2012; Dégeilh et al., 2015) or an individual who is
personally known to the participant, such as a best friend
(Heatherton et al., 2006) or mother (Zhu et al., 2007; Ray et al.,
2010; but see also Schmitz et al., 2004; Ochsner et al., 2005;
Vanderwal et al., 2008). The MPFC is known to be part of
the default mode network (Raichle et al., 2001), encompassing
brain regions that exhibit activity during the resting state. These
brain regions seem to respond whenever a person is engaged
in goal-directed tasks, by decreasing their activation relative
to baseline (Gusnard et al., 2001). The greater activity in the
MPFC during self-evaluation vs. other-evaluation tasks therefore
means that this brain region exhibits a much weaker decrease
in activity during self-evaluation tasks, compared with other-
evaluation tasks.
While studies comparing brain activity during self- vs.
other-evaluation tasks allow us to identify brain regions that
are selectively activated during the processing of information
about the self, they do not permit us to clearly state which
cognitive operations are involved in these tasks. Therefore,
findings regarding brain activation patterns may be interpreted
in different ways when it comes to the cognitive operations
they underpin, even if these interpretations remain a matter
for speculation, in the absence of direct experimental evidence.
First of all, authors seem to agree that these activations do
not reflect semantic memory involvement during self-evaluation
tasks, as semantic memory processes are characterized by a
major decrease in activity in the MPFC (Kelley et al., 2002;
Zysset et al., 2002). As episodic memory involvement results
in a weaker decrease in MPFC activity than semantic memory
involvement, Ray et al. (2010) suggested that self-evaluation
tasks involve episodic memory retrieval to a greater extent
than other-evaluation tasks. Nonetheless, this interpretation
contradicts behavioral findings reported by studies measuring
the reaction times of healthy volunteers, which show that
episodic memories are accessed far more often during judgments
of others than during self-judgments (Klein et al., 1992,
2001). While the cognitive operations sustained by the MPFC
during self-evaluation tasks have yet to be elucidated, we
suggest that another process besides the retrieval of personal
information from episodic or semantic memory may be
involved, namely introspective computation. The finding that
activity in the MPFC is greater during the judgment of
one’s own preferences (e.g., ‘‘I like Leipzig’’) than during the
retrieval of episodic memories (Zysset et al., 2002) suggests
that this activity indicates participants’ reference to their
immediate emotional state rather than the retrieval of episodic
memories.
The MPFC has been hypothesized to sustain the processing
of various kinds of self-referential information (Jenkins and
Mitchell, 2011; D’Argembeau and Salmon, 2012), and its
different areas to be linked to different cognitive functions
(Murray et al., 2012). We suggest that introspective computation
is at least partially sustained by the MPFC, but further research is
needed to find out what links introspective computation to other
cognitive tasks that recruit the MPFC. In order to improve its
understanding, direct assessment of introspective computation
in healthy controls and patients with memory disorders is
needed, as well as a better theoretical conceptualization of
the mental operations involved in each of the cognitive
tasks contrasted in this type of functional neuroimaging
studies.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we introduced the concept of introspective
computation as a possible explanation for why patients with
semantic and/or episodic memory impairments are still able
to accurately judge their personality traits. We suggest that
introspective computation, which does not rely on personal
information stored in semantic or episodic memory, is a
cognitive strategy that consists in simulating one’s behavioral
tendencies in a situation that exemplifies a given personality
trait. Instead of simulating their behavior in a detailed manner,
people who use introspective computation tend to refer to their
current inclination or affective disposition to act in one way or
another, and use it to determine whether or not they possess a
particular personality trait. Experimental studies are needed to
directly assess whether this kind of mental simulation is indeed
preserved in patients with amnesia, and which brain regions
support it.
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